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Abstract
While service outsourcing may benefit from the application of performance-based
contracts (PBCs), the implementation of such contracts is usually challenging. Service
performance is often not only dependent on supplier effort but also on the behavior of
the buying firm. Existing research on performance-based contracting provides very
limited understanding on how this challenge may be overcome. This article describes a
design science research project that develops a novel approach to buyer–supplier con-
tracting, using collaborative key performance indicators (KPIs). Collaborative KPIs
evaluate and reward not only the supplier contribution to customer performance but
also the customer's behavior to enable this. In this way, performance-based contracting
can also be applied to settings where supplier and customer activities are interdepen-
dent, while traditional contracting theories suggest that output controls are not effective
under such conditions. In the collaborative KPI contracting process, indicators measure
both supplier and customer (buying firm) performance and promote collaboration by
being defined through a collaborative process and by focusing on end-of-process indi-
cators. The article discusses the original case setting of a telecommunication service
provider experiencing critical problems in outsourcing IT services. The initial interven-
tion implementing this contracting approach produced substantial improvements, both
in performance and in the relationship between buyer and supplier. Subsequently, the
approach was tested and evaluated in two other settings, resulting in a set of actionable
propositions on the efficacy of collaborative KPI contracting. Our study demonstrates
how defining, monitoring, and incentivizing the performance of specific processes at
the buying firm can help alleviate the limitations of traditional performance-based con-
tracting when the supplier's liability for service performance is difficult to verify.
KEYWORD S
collaboration, design science research, key performance indicators (KPIs), outsourcing, performance
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Empirical evidence demonstrates that achieving the in-
tended performance outcomes of outsourcing is not easy
(Ellram, Tate, & Billington, 2008; Handley & Benton, 2013;
Stouthuysen, Slabbinck, & Roodhooft, 2012). This applies in
particular to outsourced services (Caldwell & Howard, 2011;
Ellram & Tate, 2015; Hawkins, Gravier, Berkowitz, & Muir,
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2015). One solution to overcome ineffective outsourcing
arrangements is to adopt performance-based contracts (PBCs)
(Guajardo, Cohen, Kim, & Nettesine, 2012). These contracts
support collaboration by aligning incentives of suppliers and
buyers (Eisenhardt, 1989; Selviaridis & Wynstra, 2015).
However, implementing PBCs for outsourced services is not
always feasible. Services are often coproduced by supplier
and customer, making their respective activities interdepen-
dent and their responsibilities difficult to separate (Chase,
1978; Narayanan, Jayaraman, Luo, & Swaminathan, 2011;
Sampson & Froehle, 2006). Consequently, besides environ-
mental uncertainty, the supplier also faces the behavioral
uncertainty introduced by the buying firm (Nullmeier,
Wynstra, & Van Raaij, 2016). This leads to a situation of
double moral hazard (Bhattacharya, Gaba, & Hasija, 2013;
Roels, Karmarkar, & Carr, 2010). Classical contracting theo-
ries, in particular agency theory, suggest that in such uncer-
tain situations, output-based contracts or PBCs are not
effective (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Mayer, Nickerson, & Owan, 2004). Roels et al. (2010) note
that in collaborative services, such as information technol-
ogy (IT) outsourcing, PBCs are uncommon given the chal-
lenges of low incentives in joint production, the limited
liability of the supplier, and reduced outcome measurability.
To address the behavioral uncertainty introduced by the
buying firm, we have designed and implemented a novel type
of buyer–supplier contracting, based on our field work with
several organizations that were experiencing these underre-
searched issues. This collaborative KPI contracting approach
addresses the challenge of buyer–supplier process interdepen-
dencies by accounting not only for the performance of the
supplier but also for the quality of processes at the buying
firm in enabling supplier performance. Performance measure-
ment in such a contract relies on collaborative key perfor-
mance indicators (KPIs), which encompass two main
advantages. First, by defining, incentivizing, and measuring
the quality of processes at both the supplier and the buyer,
collaborative KPIs can resolve the predicament of implement-
ing PBCs in situations of buyer–supplier interdependence.
Second, the process of identifying, in detail, the operational
service delivery processes at both the buyer and the supplier
and how they are interdependent, and constructively engaging
the stakeholders in this process, helps to create the under-
standing and commitment for these KPI sets. Collaborative
KPI contracting can be defined, in short, as a process for
developing buyer–supplier relationship performance indica-
tors that (a) promote collaboration by focusing on end-
of-process indicators; (b) are ‘two-way’ by measuring both
supplier performance and also customer (buying firm) perfor-
mance; and (3) are defined in a collaborative process, together
by the supplier and the customer (buying firm).
Various academic and management practice studies have
recently proposed related yet distinct approaches. First, exten-
sions of research on performance-based contracting investigate
the interplay between output controls and relational gover-
nance (Nullmeier et al., 2016; Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014;
Stouthuysen et al., 2012) or the interaction of output and pro-
cess controls (Cardinal, Kreutzer, & Miller, 2017; Handley &
Gray, 2013). These studies, however, do not address how con-
tracting (i.e., defining, verifying, and incentivizing) the buying
firm's performance can address some of the limitations of tra-
ditional performance-based contracting when the supplier's lia-
bility for service delivery performance is difficult to verify. A
second related body of research deals with buying firms and
consulting companies that conduct supplier satisfaction sur-
veys assessing to what extent a supplier finds the relationship
with a specific buying firm productive (e.g., Planning Perspec-
tives, 2017). Two main differences, however, with collabora-
tive KPI contracting are that supplier satisfaction survey scores
refer to the general buyer–supplier interactions (e.g., payment
behavior), regardless of the specific service or product being
exchanged, and that the satisfaction scores have no impact on
the financial rewards of the supplier (or penalties to the buyer).
One specific management practice study has advocated the
use of two-way scorecards to measure the processes “[…]
for which the buyer and strategic supplier each have specific
accountabilities and performance standards to achieve.”
(Slobodow, Abdullah, & Babuschak, 2008). However, such
scorecards are not used to determine penalty or bonus pay-
ments for the supplier. Finally, the recently proposed ‘Vested’
sourcing model combines performance-based contracting with
a ‘collaborative relationship model.’ It also emphasizes the
importance of defining high-level, strategic ‘desired outcomes’
and argues that buying firms should not specify in detail how
the supplier is to achieve those outcomes (Vitasek, Ledyard, &
Manrodt, 2013). In contrast to our collaborative KPI contract-
ing approach, however, ‘Vested’ sourcing does not address the
potential benefits of making the buying firm partly accountable
for the supplier's performance (Vitasek et al., 2013, 2015).
The collaborative KPI contracting approach was initially
developed and evaluated in an IT outsourcing relationship in
the telecommunications industry. In doing so, we combined
a design science approach (Romme, 2003; Van Aken, Chan-
drasekaran, & Halman, 2016) with a longitudinal case study
(Kaipia, Holmström, Småros, & Rajala, 2017). The objective
of the design science research (DSR) is to produce “[…]
well-tested, well-understood and well-documented innova-
tive generic designs, dealing with authentic field problems
or opportunities.” (Van Aken et al., 2016: p. 1). Although
there are differences in terminology, there appears to be con-
siderable consensus on what makes for good design
research: “[…] research questions being driven by an interest
in field problems; an emphasis on the production of
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prescriptive knowledge, linking it to interventions and sys-
tems to produce outcomes, providing the key to solving field
problems; a justification of research products largely based
on pragmatic validity (do the actions based on this knowl-
edge produce the intended outcomes?).” (Van Aken, 2004:
p. 395). Another common element is the recognition that
design research proceeds through a series of tests and refine-
ments (Jelinek, Romme, & Boland, 2008).
Our DSR started in 2003, when the Dutch telecommunica-
tions service provider KPN and its IT outsourcing partner Atos
Origin (renamed Atos in 2011) were experiencing serious
problems. In 2001, KPN had transferred its data centers, end-
user services, and software house activities to Atos Origin, but
2 years later the performance of these services and the trust
and commitment of both parties had deteriorated substantially.
KPN wanted to build stronger incentives into the contract,
whereas Atos Origin felt that its performance was seriously
affected by how KPN managed their related processes.
Our direct and intensive engagement in this field problem
helped us to understand the origins of the failure and to
develop new insights regarding collaborative KPI contracting.
We first describe the initial outsourcing contract, its implemen-
tation, and its outcomes (2001–2003). Subsequently, we exam-
ine the development, implementation, and evaluation of the
collaborative KPI contract (2003–2007). More recently, we
have conducted field tests of the collaborative KPI contracting
approach in other situations, and we present two such evalua-
tion cases in detail (in section 8). Figure 1 presents the overall
timeline of our DSR efforts. The figure also refers to a failed
case, which we briefly discuss in reviewing the transferability
of the collaborative KPI contracting approach in section 9. In
our DSR approach, we have looked for the simplest and most
likely explanations for the set of observations we made over
the years. Otherwise put, we have applied abductive reasoning,
which “[…] forms and evaluates hypotheses in order to make
sense of puzzling facts […]” (Fisher & Aguinis, 2017: p. 443).
The collaborative KPI contracting approach is the core
design artefact in our study (Holmström, Ketokivi, & Hameri,
2009). Our initial longitudinal case study also describes the
analysis and implementation process that was adopted.
Although this collaborative service design process largely relies
on existing tools and methods, we posit that its integration with
collaborative KPIs is novel. The collaborative service design
process is crucial in successfully developing and implementing
the collaborative KPI contract. To be effective, the collabora-
tive KPI contract should be adapted to the specific context and
should be supported by different functions at both the buyer
and the supplier. The collaborative service design process pro-
vides a coherent approach for achieving this.
After this introduction, we review prior research on imple-
menting performance-based contracting and the challenges of
effectively implementing such contracts in situations where
performance cannot be easily verified and attributed to the
efforts of suppliers. The method section provides details on our
initial, longitudinal case study and how we applied the design
science approach. Subsequent sections discuss the context,
interventions, outcomes, and mechanisms of this initial DSR
study. We then review two more recent evaluation cases in
which we conducted similar interventions. The paper concludes
with a set of propositions regarding the effects of collaborative
KPI contracting and the extent to which this design artefact
may be transferrable and the implications for further theory
development and practice.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW: PBCs IN
OUTSOURCED SERVICES
Different theories emphasize the distinct functions of con-
tracts. In transaction cost economics, safeguarding, that is,
minimizing opportunism and protecting investments, is the
most prominent function of contracts. Safeguards and control
can be implemented by assigning decision and termination
rights and by defining processes for dispute resolution
(Schepker, Oh, Martynov, & Poppo, 2014). In the resource-
based view, contracts serve the goal of interorganizational
coordination (Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007; Schepker
et al., 2014). Contracts may include clauses defining roles and
responsibilities and monitoring provisions. As such, contracts
serve as a blueprint for exchange, aligning the actions of both
parties (Macaulay, 1963; Vanneste & Puranam, 2010). This
FIGURE 1 Design science research
timeline [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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function of contracts is particularly relevant when tasks are
uncertain and complex (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Mayer &
Argyres, 2004). Agency theory views contracts mainly as a
vehicle to align interests and incentives and to achieve risk
sharing between the parties involved, particularly in case of
information asymmetry between parties (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory is the commonly
used theory to study the choice between contracting on effort
or behavior (process controls) or contracting on performance
or outcomes (output controls) (Selviaridis & Wynstra, 2015).
Particularly in service outsourcing, contractual governance
may be applied in the form of performance-based contracting
(Essig, Glas, Selviaridis, & Roehrich, 2016; Guajardo et al.,
2012). Performance may be measured in terms of asset or
product availability or utilization or even customer satisfaction
and monetary revenues (Nullmeier et al., 2016). Several stud-
ies on management control find empirical evidence for the
favorable effects of output monitoring on customer-supplier
relations and supplier performance (Heide, Wathne, &
Rokkan, 2007; Sumo, Van der Valk, Van Weele, & Bode,
2016; Tiwana & Keil, 2007). In practice, however, effectively
implementing performance-based contracting is challenging
(Ng & Nudurupati, 2010; Ssengooba, McPake, & Palmer,
2012). The interdependence between supplier activities and
buyer activities, which is a defining characteristic of service
exchanges, makes it difficult to effectively and efficiently ver-
ify performance in terms of outcomes and assigns rewards and
penalties based on these outcomes. Often, service suppliers are
reluctant to work under such contracts, because services
(in varying degrees) rely on customer inputs including actors
(the customer firm or its employees), physical assets, and
information (Chase, 1978; Sampson & Froehle, 2006). Sup-
pliers themselves are thus not always fully in control of
performance (Gruneberg, Hughes, & Ancell, 2007; Nullmeier
et al., 2016; Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014). Agency theory
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and other theories that study the tradeoffs
between output-based and process-based controls (Ouchi,
1979) suggest that PBCs are indeed not feasible or not effec-
tive under conditions of outcome uncertainty. For instance, a
study by Stouthuysen et al. (2012) found that output controls
have a negative effect on (perceived) supplier performance
when services involve a high degree of customization and
intensive interaction between the supplier and the client. As
Handley and Gray (2013, p. 1543) note, Mayer et al. (2004,
p. 1065) effectively summarized these challenges: “Contract-
ing for supplier liability when the buyer's actions influence the
size of the liability, or the size of the liability is difficult to
measure, is not readily feasible because of verification difficul-
ties”. Such verification problems give rise to a moral hazard in
which a supplier underprovides effort and hence quality.
Selviaridis and Norrman (2014), in a study of outsourced
logistics services, also find that one of the main antecedents of
outcome uncertainty is the service provider's control over input
and behavior of customers. The higher the impact of other fac-
tors, besides the efforts of the supplier, on the performance
outcome of the service production process, the lower the attri-
butability of the outcome. In-line with agency theory, Selviari-
dis and Norrman (2014) posit that low outcome attributability
makes service providers less willing to accept the financial
risks embedded in PBCs.
Recent research has proceeded along two main avenues
to study how these traditional shortcomings of performance-
based contracting may be addressed. The first stream of
research investigates the interaction of outcome controls and
relational governance, as a continuation of established research
on the interplay between contractual and relational governance
(Lumineau & Henderson, 2012; Poppo & Zenger, 2002;
Schepker et al., 2014). Although research on the substance of
relational governance is quite diverse, most of the literature
suggest that it consists of three main elements: trust, commit-
ment, and relational norms. Trust refers to “[…] the confi-
dence in the partner's integrity, credibility, and benevolence
in a risky exchange relationship […]” (Cao & Lumineau,
2015; p. 17). Trust can increase flexibility, enhance informa-
tion sharing, and reduce monitoring and other transaction
costs (Stevens, MacDuffie, & Helper, 2015). Commitment is
typically defined as the willingness to make short-term sacri-
fices to maintain the relationship (Anderson & Weitz, 1992).
Relational norms refer to shared expectations about the
behavior of each partner. Relational norms and ties, formed
by prior exchanges and mutual commitment for the future,
enhance cooperation in interorganizational relationships. In
a recent metaanalysis, Cao and Lumineau (2015) find strong
evidence for a complementary relationship between contrac-
tual and relational governance. Contracts, trust, and relational
norms jointly reduce opportunistic behavior and jointly
enhance relationship performance and satisfaction. Yet, dif-
ferent elements of contracts may have different effects on
relational governance (Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Weber &
Mayer, 2011). For instance, Mellewigt et al. (2007) find evi-
dence that increased levels of trust mitigate the effect of asset
specificity on contractual complexity but enhance the effect
of the need for coordination on contractual complexity.
Within this substantial body of literature on the interplay
between contractual and relational governance, there are a
few recent studies investigating the specific interplay
between output controls and relational governance. Selviari-
dis and Norrman (2014) argue that low performance attribut-
ability would require increased relational governance based
on information sharing, collaboration, and trust, which in
turn make service providers more willing to accept the risks
of PBCs. Nullmeier et al. (2016) proposed that how informa-
tion sharing by the buying organization, related to service
delivery planning and monitoring, can help to mitigate some
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of the negative effects of outcome uncertainty on supplier
efforts. One of the few recent theory testing studies in this stream
finds evidence that for high-volume routine services, information
exchange and transparency can strengthen the already positive
effects of output controls on supplier performance and, for low-
volume customized professional services, can alleviate some
of the negative effects of output controls on supplier perfor-
mance (Stouthuysen et al., 2012). These findings support the
earlier findings by Heide et al. (2007) that relational gover-
nance (specifically, relational norms such as mutually agreed
assessment standards) increases the positive effects of output
controls in curbing supplier opportunistic behavior.
A second, more modest research stream investigating how
the shortcomings of performance-based contracting may be alle-
viated examines the effects of combinations of different con-
tracting forms or controls (Cardinal et al., 2017; Selviaridis &
Wynstra, 2015). These studies observe that practitioners com-
bine output and process contracting approaches to share differ-
ent types of risks across the buyer and supplier (De Jong,
Bijlsma-Frankema, & Cardinal, 2014). For example, Handley
and Gray (2013) investigate the complementarity in use and in
effectiveness of output (or outcome) and process (or behavior)
controls. In their study of quality management practices, they
find support for a substitution effect between the use of the
output-oriented quality controls and process-oriented quality
controls. However, they also find moderate support for the com-
plementary effectiveness of the output-oriented and process-
oriented controls (Handley & Gray, 2013).
In contrast to both these two streams of research, our DSR
study demonstrates that contracting for supplier performance
in a situation of outcome uncertainty induced by buyer's
actions can still be feasible and effective, as long as these
buyer behaviors are verifiable and made accountable. Our lon-
gitudinal perspective, unlike prior cross-sectional studies, can
help to understand the process of developing collaborative
KPI contracts. This approach toward performance-based con-
tracting in situations of buyer–supplier interdependencies—
complementing the supplier-facing outcome controls with
buyer-facing outcome controls—is conceptually novel in two
ways. First, we do not study the complementarities of differ-
ent types of supplier-facing controls but examine the combi-
nation of supplier-facing and buyer-facing controls. Second,
we investigate how the process of building trust, commitment,
and relational norms can help suppliers and buying organiza-
tions to create the willingness and transparency to identify the
processes at both ends that affect the final service perfor-
mance. In other words, relational governance may pave the
way to develop meaningful performance-based contracting,
including both supplier-facing outcome controls and buying-
firm-facing outcome controls. Thus, we do not just investigate
how outcome controls can still work under situations of outcome
uncertainty (and initially, limited performance attributability)
but also how the means to achieve this (collaborate KPI con-
tracting, including buying-firm facing outcome controls) can
be defined and implemented through relational governance
mechanisms. In sum relational governance does not simply
compensate for the inadequacies of PBCs but functions as a
means to develop and implement this specific form, that is,
collaborative KPI contracting.
3 | METHOD
3.1 | A DSR approach
Our DSR process can be described in terms of the four
phases proposed in Holmström et al., (2009). Phases 1 and
2 are exploratory and design science-oriented, and Phases
3 and 4 are explanatory and theory building-oriented. This
study encompasses the first three phases. The first phase is
labeled ‘solution incubation,’ “[…] which consists in fram-
ing the problem and developing the rudiments of a potential
solution design.” (Holmström et al., 2009: p. 72). In the sec-
ond phase, ‘solution refinement,’ the rudimentary solution
design is subjected to empirical testing. The first and second
phase are conducted within our initial case study, after
which the second phase is reiterated in other contexts to vali-
date that our design artefact “[…] can be transferred (within
a certain application domain) to contexts other than the ones
in which it has been made and tested without losing its basic
effectiveness.” (Van Aken et al., 2016: p. 5). DSR and case
research approaches are complementary (Kaipia et al.,
2017). In DSR, the researcher is actively engaged in the field
problem, while in case research, the researcher is an
observer. In the third phase of ‘explanation,’ the relevance
of the solution design is established in the form of “Substan-
tive theory [….] that is developed for a narrowly defined
context and empirical application […]” (Holmström et al.,
2009: p.75). Here, one reviews the field tested design in the
context of previous research and the related propositions
from a theoretical perspective. Within the scope of the cur-
rent article, we cannot fully engage in Holmström's Phase
4 as it requires the development of a complete, formal the-
ory, but we do report on the implementation and results of
the design artefact (intervention) in multiple contexts, sup-
porting the examination of the transferability of our solution.
3.2 | Research design
Our quest in this research has been for field-tested techno-
logical rules: chunks of general knowledge linking interven-
tions or artefacts with desired outcomes or performance in
certain fields of application (Van Aken, 2004; p.228). Our
research design is the multiple case study, a typical design to
study and test technological rules: “A series of problems of
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the same class is solved, each by applying the problem solv-
ing cycle. Design knowledge is built up through the reflec-
tive cycle (…): choosing a case, planning and implementing
interventions (on the basis of the problem solving cycle),
reflecting on the results and developing design knowledge to
be tested and refined in subsequent cases.” (Van Aken,
2004; p. 229). From our original design case and the two
subsequent evaluation cases, we gained insights into when
our design artefact of the collaborative KPI contracting
approach works or works best. Finally, we formulate our
technological rules or actionable propositions in the context
of the CIMO logic for design research (Denyer, Tranfield, &
Van Aken, 2008): “IF Context contains contextual factor C1,
C2,…Cn, THEN apply Intervention I1..In to invoke mecha-
nisms M1..Mn that generate desired outcomes O1..On.”
As noted earlier, the case in which the initial solution
incubation and refinement took place is set in the telecom-
munications industry in the Netherlands in the period
2001–2007. It involves telco operator KPN and IT services
company Atos Origin (Atos). In 2001, Atos acquired IT
infrastructure, including data centers, from KPN and subse-
quently managed the related service delivery processes. In
2003, however, the outsourcing relationship turned out to be
ineffective, and this is when our design science study started.
While the implementation of collaborative KPI is, in princi-
ple, not limited to IT services, many IT outsourcing arrange-
ments involve highly interdependent service processes,
which makes this case a relevant context in which to develop
our design (Barthelemy, 2001; Bhattacharya et al., 2013;
Weeks & Feeney, 2008).
In our four-person research team, two of the authors were
directly involved in developing and implementing the initial
intervention (Phase 1 and 2). The second author, a practitioner,
was recruited as a chief procurement officer (CPO) at KPN in
the fall of 2003. The first author, an academic and part-time
consultant, had already worked with the second author in vari-
ous consultancy projects on system dynamics modeling. The
successive interventions at other organizations were also con-
ducted by the first two authors, while the practitioner had now
changed to the role of consultant/interim manager. The third
and the fourth author, both academics, collaborated with the
first two authors in analyzing the effects of the initial interven-
tion and in extracting the theoretical implications from the field
tested design artefact (Phase 3).
The structure of the subsequent sections on the initial design
case follows the CIMO logic for design research (Denyer et al.,
2008). First, we describe the initial case context (C) including
the surrounding external and internal environment factors.
Then, we introduce the intervention (I) that was designed and
implemented. While the CIMO approach obviously suggests
that mechanisms precede outcomes, we subsequently first dis-
cuss the outcomes (O) of our interventions in the KPN-Atos
case, as we can analyze the mechanisms (M) more precisely
after we have reviewed the outcomes.
4 | CONTEXT: THE FIELD
PROBLEM OF THE KPN-ATOS
OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIP
4.1 | Prologue
In the late 1990s, deregulation of the telecom market together
with the advent of new (mobile) communication technologies
and the associated investments in licenses and assets put sub-
stantial pressure on the competitive position of KPN, the
previously state-owned telecommunications provider in the
Netherlands (CNN, 2000). By the end of 2000, KPN started to
consider the possibility of divesting or outsourcing some
in-house activities that were no longer crucial to its business
strategy, such as its IT activities. These activities were human
resource intensive, required considerable management atten-
tion, and the general consensus within KPN was that outsour-
cing would improve quality. Also, KPN needed cash to pay off
its major loans. In the fall of 2001, KPN initiated a turnaround
process, focusing on cutting costs and divesting nonprofitable
and nonessential assets and using the proceeds to reduce its
massive debts. Over a period of 18 months, KPN's data center,
its end-user services, and software house were outsourced to
Atos, involving some 2,300 employees. Atos was awarded a
revenue-guarantee contract (i.e., a take-or-pay contract, where a
customer pays a penalty for any items that it orders less than
contractually agreed), allowing it to recoup its dedicated invest-
ments. The main objectives of this outsourcing deal for KPN
were short term: “Assets out, cost out, and cash in.” Therefore,
KPN's main criteria in selecting an outsourcing partner were
financial attractiveness of the bid (for the assets), the ability to
take over personnel professionally, and the ability to provide
continuity of services and subsequent cost reductions. For Atos,
the main objectives for this deal were making a serious entry
into the telecommunications industry and entering the Dutch
and German market, where KPN had a subsidiary. In 2001, the
Atos–KPN deal was one of the largest IT outsourcing deals in
Europe, adding some 20% to the revenues of Atos in managed
IT services (Atos Origin, 2001). However, in the fall of 2003,
almost two years into the contract, the relationship between
KPN and Atos had deteriorated, with low performance and
reduced trust and commitment at all levels of the relationship.
Toward the end of 2003, the service outsourcing relation
of Atos and KPN could be summarized by the following five
contextual factors:
• C1: The service delivered to KPN by Atos was essentially
one of the coproduction, which meant that performance
lapses by Atos were directly felt by KPN's customers, and
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Atos' performance was directly affected by shortcomings
in KPN's behavior toward its IT service provider.
• C2: The supply network of service processes as well as
the IT landscape were complex. Understanding the over-
all system and its leverage points was practically impossi-
ble for one person or even one department.
• C3: The financially driven contract design with its reve-
nue guarantee and cost drive led to misaligned incentives
within both parties and certainly also between them.
• C4: These three factors contributed to a ‘burning plat-
form’ of unacceptably low operational performance
toward KPN's end customers.
• C5: All these factors resulted in an all-time low relation-
ship quality on both sides, with much distrust, intranspar-
ency, and opportunistic behavior, which hurt performance
even further.
4.2 | Contextual factor C1—Coproduction of
services directly affecting customer's business
After outsourcing, Atos managed more than 40 critical IT
systems that each directly affected KPN's performance
toward its customers. If one of these systems failed, the ser-
vice itself could fail, that is, a call center agent could not
access customer information or customer order changes
could not be processed. Moreover, all these systems were
interconnected, so breakdowns could easily (and often did)
propagate throughout the IT system network, triggering
major service disruptions. Appendix A provides more details
on how closely Atos and KPN processes were intertwined in
coproducing services to KPN customers.
4.3 | Contextual factor C2—Complex
operational service process network
The network of IT systems and service processes that deliv-
ered services to KPN customers was very complex. The IT
landscape was a patchwork of partly outsourced, partly still
KPN internal IT systems: often legacy systems, with some
1,700 point-to-point interfaces between them, which had to be
maintained and monitored continuously. Also, the manage-
ment of this network was very fragmented and complex and
not very effective. For example, at KPN, server SLAs were
managed by at least four or five KPN managers, each involved
solely from their own functional perspective. On the supplier
side, Atos managers controlled only parts of the system land-
scape. Communication among all these individuals was mainly
by e-mail. Most operational managers were barely acquainted
with one another and did not understand their process interde-
pendencies. During the interventions, KPN employees would
introduce themselves not just to Atos staff but also to each
other. The same was true for Atos employees. So the key
people involved on a day-to-day basis only knew each other's
email addresses and had never met before in real life. Higher
up, at middle and certainly higher management levels, there
was very limited knowledge of shop floor processes and inter-
dependencies between processes and systems. As a result, their
complexity was daunting to most.
4.4 | Contextual factor C3—Financially
driven contract leading to misaligned incentives
The contract design, with its revenue guarantees and no
explicit incentives for innovation, led to misaligned incen-
tives in multiple ways. The contract drawn up in 2001 stipu-
lated for each year of the 2002–2007 period, a guaranteed
revenue for Atos. In case of a shortfall, KPN would pay a
penalty equal to 25% of the shortfall in each of the first three
years and 50% of the shortfall in each of the latter three
years. Over 2002, KPN already had to pay a penalty of sev-
eral million Euro. KPN was able to mitigate that penalty by
offering Atos revenue with respect to alternative projects.
Within KPN, departments focused on very different KPIs,
some focusing on costs, others on revenue and response times.
The lack of management at the strategic level resulted in misa-
ligned incentives and lack of transparency. In turn, this led to
complacency and lack of innovative solutions. KPN continued
to procure services from Atos just to avoid paying penalties.
Internally, both companies were internally still quite stove-
piped, with departments focusing on very different KPIs. KPN
business units focused on customer response times, while the
purchasing department focused on acquisition price. Typically,
Atos managed its service lines on costs, but the account teams
were managed on revenue and therefore more focused on new
business than on solving issues in existing relations. As a con-
sequence, internal transparency and collaboration on both
sides was quite limited.
During the outsourcing, there had been a clear alignment
of goals between Atos and KPN. However, this alignment
deteriorated fast. Already during the outsourcing implemen-
tation in 2001–2002, the internet bubble burst and the tele-
com business declined fast. This meant that the value of
KPN's assets to Atos, as a springboard into the telecom mar-
ket, was seriously reduced. Atos therefore became more
dependent on the returns from the outsourcing deal with
KPN, rather than on additional external revenue growth. As
a result, KPN's increasing emphasis on cost reduction con-
flicted with Atos' revenue aspirations.
The outlook for the upcoming years (2004–2007) looked
bleak as KPN was drastically reducing its IT spend, which
would lead to massive penalties under the revenue guarantee
provisions. KPN's conservative estimate ran into more than
20 million Euro penalty exposure.
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Additionally, the partnering vision implicit in the original
outsourcing arrangement was ‘lost in translation’ when the
specifics of the service-level agreements were worked out,
resulting in conventional adversarial buyer–supplier role def-
initions. In senior management contacts, both sides kept
their ‘cards close to their chest’ and acted under an assump-
tion of zero-sum-gaming. Gradually, the partner board,
which was the regular meeting of senior management on
both sides, became a meeting of adversaries, not of partners.
The relationship—involving a contract that was worth hun-
dreds of millions of euros annually—was not managed by
KPN at a strategic level but by two procurement managers.
4.5 | Contextual factor C4—Burning platform
of low operational performance and financial
losses
By the end of 2003, operational performance had become so
poor that it acted as a ‘burning platform’ to motivate both
companies to seek urgent action. Performance was at an
all-time low. For instance, in KPN's basic telephone (i.e.,
landline) services, there were an extremely high percentage of
15% customer complaints after something as basic as moving
house or changing the type of subscription. At the call center,
customer queries—the bulk of which were standard and
straightforward—were resolved in only 82% of the cases,
while the first time right (FTR) norm was 95%. This dismal
performance was reinforced by misalignment at the tactical
level through large sets of purely technical and fragmented
KPIs, rather than through a small and coherent set of intercon-
nected process KPIs. In 2003 alone, there were over 20 escala-
tions of operational issues as resolving performance issues at
the operational level became more problematic. Meanwhile,
KPN continued to procure services from Atos—even when
the relevance of their expertise was in doubt—just to avoid
paying penalties from the outsourcing agreement. Obviously,
this poor performance costs extra manpower on both sides.
4.6 | Contextual factor C5—Low relationship
quality: Mistrust on both sides
In 2003, KPN's internal client satisfaction with Atos, which
can be seen as a proxy of trust in this context, was 3.9 on a
10-point scale. In the light of this, it is not surprising that in
that year over a hundred new IT projects were started with
other IT suppliers, while the original plan was that Atos
would be the sole IT services supplier. KPN had seriously
considered replacing Atos as its outsourcing partner but ulti-
mately there was no feasible alternative. KPN's cost-down
drive was in direct conflict with the revenue guarantees that
had been given to Atos in the original outsourcing deal.
These guarantees led to complacency, which triggered
irritation at KPN. Meanwhile, KPN's IT demand manage-
ment competencies had effectively been outsourced to Atos,
and Atos did not introduce innovative solutions to avoid
risky and costly investments. Internally in KPN there were
also tensions. KPN top management had originally viewed
outsourcing mainly as a financial instrument to generate cash
to payoff the huge debts. The outsourcing deals had mostly
been a corporate affair, while KPN's business units had to
put up with the costs and the unsatisfactory performance of
this outsourcing relationship.
5 | DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING
THE INTERVENTION
5.1 | Solution incubation: Framing a potential
design for the application domain
As Holmström et al. (2009) points out, framing the problem
is often a key issue in design research. At KPN, many stake-
holders framed the problem as one of a supplier who abused
a contract. Similarly, at Atos, KPN was seen as the unreli-
able business partner. The second author, who had become
the CPO of KPN in the fall of 2003, framed the problem
quite differently. From his extensive experience as general
manager of one of the Toyota's suppliers, three things were
clear to him. First, that the solution to the current problems
was in the ‘gemba,’ in the actual operations at the factory
floor, as invariably is the case in the Toyota Production Sys-
tem (Shingo, 1989). Second, that such a solution would
require KPN to reach out to Atos in a constructive effort at
supplier development, Toyota style (Liker & Choi, 2004).
There could be no zero-sum game between supplier and cus-
tomer; a strategic partnership was required given the impor-
tance of the IT services for KPN's operations. Third, that in
order to build such a strategic partnership, the nature of the
collaboration and therefore the type of contract would have
to change. From his industrial background, the new CPO
had prior experience with redesigning buyer–supplier set-
tings into PBC settings. Indeed, in his role as CPO for his
prior employer, he had successfully turned around a situation
of bad supplier performance in industrial maintenance into
one of the good performance, partly by redefining the con-
tract as a performance-based one. In services, however, it is
complicated to delineate where the performance impact of
the supplier ends and where the customer becomes responsi-
ble. This fact was not lost on the CPO, but in the earlier
industrial maintenance setting this had also been the case,
and the turnaround had been successful nonetheless. In
short, it was clear to the KPN CPO that the change method
would have to (a) focus on operational improvements;
(b) use operational performance KPIs to incentivize the sup-
plier; and (c) do so in a collaborative partnership.
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The CPO turned to the first author for help in bringing
about this change, building on his work in developing
models of operations strategy issues with groups of man-
agers, mostly in manufacturing industries. His method that
focused on group-modeling building processes (Vennix,
1996) was aimed at creating greater transparency and trust
between stakeholders from different companies, by jointly
mapping out ‘the whole elephant’ (Senge, 1990) and by cre-
ating room to ‘unfreeze’ the buyer–supplier setting (Lewin,
1951). From there on, parties can jointly develop a new
mode of organizing and governance. In summary, the two
authors together had the makings of what was a promising
potential design (Holmström et al., 2009). Also, the techno-
logical rules in their professional repertoire suggested that
the application domain as described above was a challenging
one (Van Aken, 2004). The collaborative KPI contracting
approach consisted of two major elements:
• I1. The suite of process interventions used to develop the
collaborative KPIs.
• I2. The collaborative KPI contracting the method itself.
5.2 | Intervention I1—Process interventions to
develop collaborative KPIs
None of the process interventions are new in themselves.
The novelty arises from the collaborative KPI contracting
approach that they are used for and integrated with.
5.2.1 | Reframing the relationship from
adversarial to partnership
The relationship was adversarial and zero-sum minded, also at
top management. To have a fair chance of success, the relation-
ship at the top management level had to be reframed into a stra-
tegic partnership, with significant relation-specific investments
on both sides. This redefinition was not an easy task. Of
course, there was the burning platform of the dramatic opera-
tional performance. Still, it took a veiled threat to the Atos
CEO to get a go-ahead from the supplier side. At one of the
partner board meetings, the KPN CFO, to whom the CPO
reported, made it clear that if Atos would not go along with this
new drive, KPN would publicly announce its dissatisfaction
and its intention to move to alternative suppliers. This threat
was effective. The much disliked revenue guarantees were
removed from the contract, and both parties formally agreed to
redefine the outsourcing relationship into a partnership mode.
5.2.2 | The pot of gold
In a way, the revenue guarantees became very helpful to
incentivize both parties to behave as partners. The net
present value of the possible cumulative penalty payments
by KPN to Atos under the previous revenue guarantee con-
tract was calculated. This sum was put in a dedicated
reserve; a ‘pot of gold’ as it was called at the time. The
bonuses under the collaborative KPI contract could be paid
out of this account in the years to come. If Atos met its per-
formance targets, the company would have ‘drawing rights’
for payments from this ‘pot of gold.’ For KPN, failure to
meet its performance targets would result in financial penal-
ties, that is, additional drawing rights for Atos. The actual
payments of the drawing rights, or bonuses, had to be
funded by the specific functions or business units that did
not comply with the KPIs and would directly impact their
operating budgets. Both the potential penalties and drawing
rights were substantial; the potential KPN penalties
amounted to a maximum of €15 million, and the potential
bonus for Atos was €18 million, for the 2004–2007 period.
We discuss this in further detail below.
5.2.3 | Interviews and group meetings on both
sides
The first two authors took the lead, starting with a round of
interviews at all levels of the KPN organization in the third
quarter of 2003. The insights gained from these interviews
led to a series of meetings with both parties, in a confidential
setting, to assess and recalibrate strategic commitment and
alignment between both parties. Both parties agreed to code-
sign the new way of working by detailing out operational
processes and performance targets in one business area
(standard fixed-line telephony).
5.2.4 | Root cause analysis workshop
The foundation for this new strategic partnership was laid in
a 2.5 day off-site session of some twenty executives from
both parties. A key technique applied in this root cause anal-
ysis workshop was group model-building (Vennix, 1996), in
which the entire group went through a causal loop diagram-
ming session, identifying interdependencies and causal
linkages between end customer performance and actions
throughout the service supply chain (see Appendix A). The
session aimed at exploring the question: “What happens
when something goes wrong in the operations?” This made
it clear how actions from the IT supplier directly and indi-
rectly affected KPN customer satisfaction.
The root cause analysis workshop process revealed clear
technical reasons behind the severe performance issues. It
also highlighted that there were also organizational causes
for the problems, problems of misaligned incentives and lim-
ited communication between parties. It revealed the dysfunc-
tional nature of the existing detailed KPIs or service-level
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agreements (SLAs) as they were called in this IT context.
There were thousands of these SLAs, all defined at a very
specific technical level. For example, if a server was per-
forming according to its SLA, Atos could not be penalized,
even if complaint levels were high (as a result of broader
quality issues).
5.3 | Intervention I2—The collaborative KPI
contracting method itself
Following this initial workshop, a series of further
workshops were organized to specify the KPIs, the sub-
KPIs, the measurement process, normalization, and the
determination of the relevant data sources in detail. An
important outcome was a true and detailed understanding
that delivering the service involved coproduction by both
parties. Therefore, the required KPIs had to be collabora-
tive in three distinct ways. First, they had to register to
what extent Atos supported KPN's business goal. The aim
was that Atos should measurably contribute to improving
KPN's business performance by enhancing end-customer
satisfaction and reducing complaint levels in KPN's fixed-
telephone business. Second, the KPIs also had to support
the supplier. If Atos was to perform well, it needed KPN's
collaboration as well. Therefore, KPIs were needed not
just for the supplier but also for the customer: in other
words, two-way performance targets. Third, the KPIs had
to be codeveloped together, in a collaborative process, to
gain support from both parties. Without our intervention-
oriented DSR approach, these insights would have been
much less likely to emerge.
Both parties agreed that operational and enabling KPIs
were required for both Atos and KPN. Four top-level KPIs
were developed for Atos and two for KPN. Table 1 presents
the top-level KPIs, and the corresponding maximum bonuses
(for good performance by Atos) and penalties (for bad per-
formance by KPN). Details of these KPIs and their targets
are explained in Appendix B. Each top-level KPI was an
aggregate of supporting KPIs, structured as a KPI tree. Atos
and KPN's ‘operational and enabling KPIs’ were defined as
the core of the collaborative KPI contracting approach. The
operational and enabling KPIs were considered collaborative
in the sense that KPN could actively contribute to Atos
delivering better performance. The development of these
KPIs took about 2 months.
Both parties recognized that the complex collaborative
KPI structure would require significant work to sustain it, as
well as an organization that could deal with any future
issues. As a result, a joint collaborative KPI office was set
up to manage and monitor the main KPIs and their support-
ive KPI trees. Its mission was to facilitate and provide assur-
ance in monitoring the KPIs to develop a full-fledged
business partnership between KPN and Atos. This office
involved both parties. At KPN, it was part of the corporate
purchasing department, and at Atos, it was part of the KPN
customer unit.
6 | OUTCOMES OF THE
INTERVENTIONS
We now describe the four main closely interrelated out-
comes of the two interventions.
6.1 | Outcome O1—Transparency of process
performance and its drivers
Operationally, KPN and Atos started to work as a team to
measure performance and to continually improve it, under
a policy of maximum transparency. The collaborative KPIs
offered clear alignment opportunities to do so. At the tacti-
cal level, innovative Atos ideas aimed at simplification
and rationalization of IT architecture, and processes were
implemented as the focus of the relationship moved from a
‘cost-down’ drive to a ‘quality and collaboration’ move-
ment. At the strategic level, there was also more transpar-
ency under the collaborative KPI contract. Both parties
received regular updates of strategic issues at the now
well-functioning partner board. As targeted by the ‘sell to,
with, and through each other’ KPI, both parties started
addressing corporate customers with joint business propo-
sitions, with KPN addressing telecom needs and Atos
other IT needs, and this led to several successes. KPN did
not quite have its IT governance in order, which was detri-
mental to Atos's project planning and operations, but these
issues were now discussed at partner board level. This
TABLE 1 Maximum bonus and penalty payments 2004–2007
(in € million)
2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Collaborative KPIs for Atos
Innovation and redesign 1 0.5 0.5 0 2
Operational and enabling KPIs 2 2 1.5 1 6.5
TCO (35% reduction target) 2.5 2 0 0 4.5
KPN BU client satisfaction 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2
Sell to, with, and through Atos 1 1 0.5 0.5 3
Total 7 6 3 2 18
Collaborative KPIs for KPN
Atos wallet share at KPN BUs 2 4 2 1 9
IT governance 1 2 0.5 0 3.5
Operational and enabling KPIs 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.5
Total 4 6.5 3 1.5 15
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also resulted in significant penalty payments from KPN
to Atos.
6.2 | Outcome O2—Performance
transparency improves decision-making
In their case study of the design of an interorganizational
planning process in a high-tech electronics supply chain,
Akkermans, Bogerd, and Van Doremalen (2004) identified
strong interrelations between transparency and trust between
the partners and the performance achieved. The KPN‑Atos
case echoes this. A strong relation was observed between the
transparency achieved through better communication and
the resulting quality of the decision-making. Better decisions
led to better performance, leading to more trust, leading to
even more transparency, and so on. The workshops were
needed to kick-start this virtuous cycle. They provided the
‘travail,’ the joint hard work that led to the first gains in
transparency and trust (Akkermans et al., 2004).
6.3 | Outcome O3—Improved operational
performance
The performance outcomes of the interventions are shown in
Table 2. At the operational level, the percentage of rework
decreased from 14 to around 8% within five months after
finalizing the intervention process (see Figure 2). Customer
complaints fell from 15 to 5% over the first two years. FTR
call resolution rose from 82 to 95%. Also, significant total
cost of ownership savings were achieved. Financially, this
resulted in Atos receiving almost €17.9 million in the
2004–2007 period. This included €14.7 million due to Atos's
improved performance but also €3.2 million due to penalties
incurred by KPN.
6.4 | Outcome O4—Improved relationship
quality
The joint ‘Collaborative KPI Office’ worked effectively
in reducing the complaint level. This collaboration also
fostered trust at the operational level. An ‘Atos unless’
policy was implemented and was effective, fostering Atos
trust in KPN. At the strategic level, the renegotiated con-
tract signified collaboration and partnership, which was
radically different from the old contract that encouraged
cost, antagonistic behavior, and control. The development
of the KPN client satisfaction scores, based on a survey of
client satisfaction in the KPN BUs, clearly illustrates this
(see Table 2). At the end of 2003, client satisfaction had
hit an all-time low of 3.9. Subsequently, client satisfaction
rose from 4.2 in 2004 to 6.2 in 2007. This meant a bonus
for Atos of €0.4 million in 2007 against a maximum of
€0.5 million. As a KPN senior executive stated in 2007:
TABLE 2 Performance outcomes
Strategic KPN satisfaction from 4.2 (2004) to 5.6 (2005),
5.9 (2006) and 6.2 (2007)
Cumulatively, €17.9 M paid to Atos; €14.7 M
related to positive incentives Atos and €3.2 M
tied to KPN penalties.
Total cost of ownership savings achieved of
€48 M.
KPI ‘sell to, with, and through Atos’ was major
success.
Tactical Host of innovative Atos ideas implemented.
Focus on quality and collaboration.
Simplification and rationalization drive.
Potential conflicts captured and addressed before
reaching escalation levels.
Operational Complaint level fell from 15 to 5% in two years.
Service order rework reduced from 14 to 8%.
First time right call resolution increased from
82 to 95%.
FIGURE 2 Service rework/aftercare at KPN-Atos, 2004–2006 (as percentage of total service requests/tickets) [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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“The collaborative KPIs were instrumental in
building trust for the cooperation between KPN
and Atos in an innovative business area where
both parties could benefit only if they were will-
ing to invest and change their mode of opera-
tions. The success was safeguarded by setting
attainable goals with a healthy balance in ambi-
tion and practical measurement of progress. The
workforce at both Atos and KPN was empowered
at operational management level to drive the col-
laborative KPIs. Not boardroom deal-making,
but a better understanding of each other's pro-
cesses, creating value together.” (Director of IT
Operations KPN, 2004–2007)
Also Atos management was very positive about the process
and outcomes:
“The collaborative KPIs have been the lever for
Atos Origin to change its behavior towards its
customers. It has opened our vision towards a
more customer-focused attitude. It has regained
trust in cooperation between KPN and Atos in
conjunction with innovations to the benefit of
both parties. Finally, success was safeguarded
by mutual incentives for both Customer and
vendor.” (Executive Vice President Managed
Operations, Atos Origin)
7 | THE MECHANISMS
Our analysis is that the following four mechanisms collec-
tively explain the successful turnaround in this service out-
sourcing contract:
• M1: Stakeholders on both sides showed a genuine will-
ingness to engage in a novel and high-risk process.
• M2: At the operational level, systemic thinking and
modeling facilitated integral process understanding.
• M3: The collaborative design process fostered consensus
and commitment on both sides.
• M4: Incentives were aligned through well-chosen collab-
orative KPIs.
These four mechanisms together led to a reversal of a
vicious cycle of lower trust, transparency, and performance
into a virtuous cycle of more transparency leading to more
trust and to better performance (Autry & Golicic, 2010).
7.1 | Mechanism M1—Willingness to engage
in open dialogue to ‘unfreeze’
Both Atos and KPN had a lot to lose when they engaged in
the collaborative design process. However, it was clear that
this was not time to get stuck in organizational inertia
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). As long ago as Lewin (1951), it
is known that successful organizational change requires a
willingness to ‘unfreeze.’ The burning platform of the per-
formance problems was an essential requirement to start the
change process in the first place. Given our experiences in
the later field tests, we believe that the senior management
role of the second author helped but having a CPO act as pri-
mary change agent does not seem an essential requirement.
7.2 | Mechanism M2—Systemic end-to-end
modeling leads to integral understanding
Systems thinking has long been identified as one of the five
disciplines that together constitute the learning organization
(Senge, 1990). This is just as true in interorganizational con-
texts (e.g, Vennix, 1996). In complex interorganizational
processes, nobody sees much more than just a small part of
the whole network. Once the collective insight emerges that
the way of working so far is simply not effective, in this case
from the group modeling process, many people will be will-
ing to change their behavior. When ‘the whole elephant’
becomes visible, design flaws become more visible as well.
As a result of the group model building process, opera-
tions managers from both KPN and Atos recognized not
only what went wrong but also why things went wrong.
More importantly, they saw how they could cooperate and
address the identified problems. At the beginning of the
root cause analysis workshop, a slightly hostile ‘us against
them’ atmosphere could still be felt. However, managers
who at the beginning of the session were at arm's length
later could be found in the bar well beyond bedtime, dis-
cussing ways to enhance the service delivery process. This
enthusiasm led the participants to reach across company
borders. The clear joint objective helped operations man-
agers to embrace the business aim of the process: reducing
complaint levels that directly affected KPN customer
satisfaction.
The careful systematic analysis of all the mutual interde-
pendencies in the service processes also identified the most
important indicators for effective collaborative KPIs. Financial
incentives were tied to final outcomes such as KPN's customer
satisfaction—and not, for instance, the uptime of individual
servers. The systemic approach supported the feasibility of
finding and measuring such KPIs and helped stakeholders to
appreciate the logic of the collaborative KPIs.
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7.3 | Mechanism M3—the collaborative design
process fosters consensus and commitment
Both parties were equal in this design process. They were
equal because they were both essential to solving the joint
problems and because they both contributed crucial knowl-
edge. The service (re)design process reflected this inherent
equality and mutual respect. This led to high perceived ‘proce-
dural justice’ (Rawls, 1971) for the collaborative KPIs and
thereby also to consensus and commitment to achieve them.
7.4 | Mechanism M4—Align incentives
through well-chosen collaborative KPIs
PBCs can have positive effects but not under all conditions.
As discussed in the literature review, if output is uncertain due
to influence beyond the control of the supplier, implementing
PBCs may be very costly as the supplier will demand a very
high cost-of-risk premium, or it may not be feasible at all if
the supplier is not willing to take the risk. Partly, this uncer-
tainty is dependent on the behavior of the buying firm. For
instance, does the buyer provide sufficient and timely informa-
tion to the supplier, so the latter can plan its production activi-
ties optimally? Does the buying firm sufficiently collaborate in
the actual execution of activities, for instance, by providing the
supplier with timely access to malfunctioning equipment on its
premises, which the supplier needs to repair? As suggested
earlier, the essentially coproductive or interdependent nature
of services only exacerbates this problem. Efforts to imple-
ment performance-based contracting, particularly in the con-
text of complex and interdependent B2B services, should
focus on addressing the role and impact of customer-induced
uncertainty. So, how can this source of uncertainty be reduced,
or at least accounted for, so that PBCs can also be implemen-
ted in these situations?
We argue that collaborative KPIs are an effective solution
to this problem. As discussed, in this case, four top-level KPIs
were established for Atos and two for KPN. The total amount
of bonuses available over the period 2004–2007 was 33 € mil-
lion; 18 € million was tied to the performance of Atos, and
15 € million to the performance of KPN (Table 1). The fact
that KPIs were used to assess also KPN's performance, and
that this was included in the calculation of penalties and
rewards, is the most explicit way of addressing the interdepen-
dent nature of the service operations and exchange process,
making a PBC effective even in such a situation of (buyer-
induced) outcome uncertainty. Tying salient financial conse-
quences to performance levels on KPIs and enforcing the
actual payment of bonuses and penalties helps focus manage-
ment attention. When a CIO has to pay €0.5 million to an IT
vendor because his own IT governance has not been working
properly, leading to late information to that vendor, the sup-
plier's interests will be better safeguarded in the future.
In our analysis of the case, we have thus identified five
contextual variables that triggered the search for a solution
to the severe problems in the relationship between KPN and
Atos. We evaluated the implementation of the two interven-
tions in terms of four performance outcomes and identified
four mechanisms that explain how the design artefact led to
these outcomes. Our complete CIMO framework is pre-
sented in Figure 3. Similar representations have placed the
mechanisms before the interventions to depict the sequence
of designing an intervention (cf. Groop, Ketokivi, Gupta, &
Holmström, 2017). We choose to present the elements in the
C-I-M-O order, as we intend to represent for any given inter-
vention the sequence of context affecting the applicability
and details of the interventions, which trigger mechanisms
that subsequently lead to outcomes.
8 | DESIGN EVALUATION IN
OTHER CONTEXTS
In the decade following the initial design of the collaborative
KPI contracting approach, the first two authors have applied
several similar interventions. The choice of these intervention
cases was not ‘a priori’ theory driven. In DSR studies, the
selection of cases is highly dependent on the availability of
case study organizations. Designing and implementing the col-
laborative KPI contracting approach requires considerable
investments in time and effort by the buying firm and the sup-
plier involved. These organizations also need to be willing to
let researchers document and share the process and outcomes.
Here, we present two of these interventions as evalua-
tion cases, which can deliver relevant insights regarding
transferability: what is the efficacy of the collaborative
KPI contracting approach in other contexts? (Holmström
et al., 2009; Van Aken et al., 2016). The two cases selected
are highly similar in terms of the five contextual factors
identified in the original case setting, suggesting that the
collaborative KPI contracting approach would be effective.
There is buyer–supplier coproduction of services (C1), a
complex operational service network (C2), there are finan-
cially driven contracts (C3), a burning platform of low
operational performance (C4), and low relationship quality
(C5). The two evaluation cases also represent the most
complete interventions in relation to the original design. In
contrast, there are differences with the original case in
terms of the application domain. Like the KPN-Atos case,
the two cases involve IT services but they pertain to
different business processes (ship traffic regulation and
human resource management). The cases are also from dif-
ferent customer sectors (port authorities/public infrastruc-
ture and energy). Thus, the evaluation cases can bring
insights whether the efficacy of the collaborative KPI con-
tracting approach is affected by the application domain
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characteristics. They are also set relatively recently; in
2011–2012 and 2015, respectively.
Finally, compared to the initial design case, the two cases
represent variations in two of the contextual factors, which
make them even more interesting as evaluation cases. In the
first evaluation case, outsourced IT services for a port author-
ity, the operational service network is not only complex, but
the specific service process we focus on—incident manage-
ment in ship traffic regulation—is also a discontinuous and
variable process rather than a highly repetitive service process.
This increases the complexity of the service process, as there
is more variety in the incidents and the detailed service pro-
cesses required and the time pressure is high (variation of C2).
In the second case, outsourced IT services for an energy com-
pany in the area of human resource management, the copro-
duced service affects the customer's operations but not directly
the customers of the customer (variation of C1). In sum, the
evaluation cases are testing whether the efficacy of the collab-
orative KPI contracting approach is affected by variations in
two of the core contextual factors, and whether its efficacy is
affected by application domain characteristics.
8.1 | Evaluation case 1: Outsourced IT
services for a port authority
This case concerns an IT outsourcing relationship between a
European port authority and a mid-sized European IT service
provider. This relationship started in 2007 with the outsour-
cing of the port authority's maritime IT system and related
processes, which are enabling port officials (in the port con-
trol room but also on the water) to manage the flow of
inbound and outbound traffic including enforcing regulatory
requirements. Ship pilots would also rely on these systems for
navigation, and failure in the performance of these systems
would at best lead to serious delays and at worst to dangerous
incidents. The most critical part of these services involves
incident management: mobilization, incident resolution,
incident knowledge management, incident prevention, and inci-
dent mitigation. The joint work processes of the port authority
and the vendor in incident management, as described in detail
below, were closely interdependent (C1) and, also given the
variety in possible incident situations, quite complex (C2).
In 2011, four years into the outsourcing relationship, the
relation between the two parties had substantially deteriorated.
The original contract had led to misaligned incentives (C3). It
had been strongly cost-driven, resulting in severely hampered
investments in quality improvements, to the dismay of the
port authority. Both parties blamed the other side for the pre-
sent difficulties. There were no end-of-process KPIs, just
monthly (internal) customer satisfaction measurements. Oper-
ational performance was poor, and several dangerous and
frustrating incidents had occurred. Satisfaction with the off-
site, outsourced customer helpdesk was very low. Thus, there
was clearly a burning platform for change (C4), related to low
relationship quality with mistrust on both sides (C5). Contract
renewal would be up in the following year, and it was clear
that major changes were needed, urgently.
This setting made both parties motivated to engage in a full
intervention process, as in the KPN-Atos case (M1). In the
first months of 2012, systemic end-to-end modeling took place
to obtain integral understanding of the processes involved
(M2). After a round of interviews, a collaborative diagnostics
workshop was conducted, which generated quite some enthu-
siasm from the 20-odd participants. A group model building
FIGURE 3 CIMO framework for the collaborative KPI contracting approach
AKKERMANS ET AL. 35
session generated a causal loop diagram that showed close
interdependencies as well as leverage points for performance
improvements. The subsequent improvement task was split up
into four teams, corresponding to the incident management
processes mentioned earlier. Each team was staffed with repre-
sentatives from both companies and made responsible for
identifying the KPIs, redesigning work processes, and ulti-
mately for improving performance. This integral collaborative
service redesign effort took almost one full year.
The initial collaborative diagnostics workshop was
important in identifying the process interdependencies in
mobilization and incident resolution but also key in creating
the commitment at operational and middle management
levels to push through the service redesign effort. The subse-
quent scope focused on operational performance improve-
ments, working simultaneously to redefine the working
relationship into a partnership mode (M3). The penultimate
steering committee meeting in April 2012 was fully dedi-
cated to the specification of collaborative KPIs (M4). It was
decided that these collaborative KPIs were to replace the tra-
ditional bonus/malus arrangements. Similar to the collabora-
tive KPI structure that was developed for the KPN-Atos
case, different collaborative KPI ‘buckets’ were used: opera-
tional and enabling KPIs; bi-directional overall satisfaction
KPI; and strategic collaboration. For the three buckets com-
bined, the total weight of supplier-facing KPIs was 45%
while customer-facing KPIs weighted for 30%. In this case,
we also defined joint KPIs (25% weight); KPIs that were
impossible to allocate to just one of the two parties. The
respective specific KPIs are explained in more detail below.
As in the KPN-Atos case, the relative size of the financial
incentives was modest; around 1% of the total contract
value, funded equally by both sides.
8.1.1 | Mobilization
Within minutes after the occurrence of a serious incident
regarding maritime-related IT, all the relevant actors needed
to convene and engage in concerted decision-making and
action. Serious incidents occurred, for example, when a cam-
era at a particular important bridge, with high traffic density
and a narrow passage, malfunctioned and the responsiveness
of the service provider was lagging behind and no status
updates were issued. Another instance involved the pro-
longed malfunctioning of the dynamic harbor chart, prevent-
ing most of the largest container ships berthing at the quays,
as there were no water depth information available, leading
to severe constraints in harbor approaches (because water
depths in this port are strongly affected by the tide). The rel-
evant actors would be from both the customer and the ser-
vice provider and sometimes external stakeholders. This was
a process in which both service provider and client had to
collaborate seamlessly, hence the need for KPIs both for the
supplier and for the buyer. The port authority was responsi-
ble for the “Speed and quality of the conference call” (15%
weight within the operational and enabling KPI bucket) with
all the relevant parties within minutes after the incident was
reported. The quality of the work done subsequently by the
supplier depended heavily on the quality of this call. The
supplier was responsible for “First Time Right routing”
(FTR; 5% weight). This refers to the percentage of cases in
which the IT service provider's call center could immediately
locate the right expertise to deal with the issue at hand. The
second supplier-facing KPI was “Customer satisfaction”
(20% weight), referring to the satisfaction that port authority
employees (within the maritime operations) have with regard
to the service provider's call center.
8.1.2 | Incident resolution
Resolving the incident typically required the efforts from both
customer and supplier. Two KPIs were defined: “Number of
major incidents” (5% weight) and “Turnaround resolution
duration” (10% weight). Both are clearly end-of-process KPIs,
the scores on which are jointly determined by the actions of
both parties. It was explicitly acknowledged that, irrespective
of where a major incident originated, incidents and incident
resolution were a joint responsibility and therefore assessed
through joint KPIs. Still, the governance structure and demar-
cations of authority between both organizations, and within
them, needed to be crystal clear to reduce incidents and to
achieve the most effective resolution process.
The discontinuous or irregular delivery of these incident-
related services was the main reason that no performance
indicators related to external customers were included in the
KPIs. Even though port users and health and safety authori-
ties could be directly affected by (lack of) adequate incident
handling, it is more challenging to consistently include per-
formance or satisfaction measures for such external users.
The other two main work processes, knowledge manage-
ment and incident prevention and mitigation, were defined as
tactical processes enabling effective and efficient operational
processes of mobilization and incident resolution. Knowledge
management referred to all the information that needed to be
available and shared on both sides to successfully conduct this
and the other stages. A common vocabulary was key here, as
well as the quality of the reporting about incidents, their
causes, and how they were handled. Again, this was very
much a coproduced activity. Three enabling KPIs were
defined: lead-time for updating knowledge base (supplier-fac-
ing; 10% weight); define workaround and implementation of
definitive solution (customer-facing; 15%); no closing of ticket
without change workaround (supplier-facing; 10%). Incident
prevention and mitigation, essentially proactive monitoring
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(10% weight), would have to be deployed by both parties. At
the time of our intervention, the incident prevention and miti-
gation process still had to be designed in detail.
Following (and already during) the collaborative change
effort, process performance became transparent to both parties
(O1) and trust improved on both sides (O4). For example, the
port authority IT manager explained: “Every morning, we all
gather around the plan board to see what progress has been
made on specific topics.” The most important outcome was
improved operational performance (O3). The number of
IT-related maritime incidents dropped substantially, as shown
in Figure 4. The data reported there also demonstrates that,
interestingly, the share of supplier-induced incidents declines
over time. In addition, customer satisfaction with help desk
performance, which had been very low at first, quickly
reached satisfactory levels. Note, although, that these perfor-
mance data span a relatively short period.
Two years later, the port authority's director of IT services
reflected as follows: “We launched the KPIs in combination
with a bonus/malus arrangement. The proceeds went not only
to the service provider, but were also used to finance improve-
ment projects. Thanks to the introduction of collaborative
KPIs, the resolution time of major incidents has been reduced
from 8 hours to less than 4 hours. […] Also the port authority
has responsibilities in meeting certain KPIs: in major inci-
dents, the authority has to assure that within 30 min the right
people from the suppliers involved are gathered around the
same table.” (Hmamouch, 2014; our translation).
8.2 | Evaluation case 2: Outsourced IT
services for an energy company
In 2013, a mid-size Dutch energy company had outsourced its
IT-based human resource (HR) services and salary administra-
tion, and by 2015 it was experiencing deteriorating performance.
The process design was that employees and managers, in a
digitally supported Do-It-Yourself (DIY) mode, would sub-
mit changes in their own HR details and as well as in those
of their direct reports. This included, for instance, entering
details of new employees or reporting sick leaves. The DIY
principle made this very much a coproduced service; to
achieve a certain quality level in the HR and payroll ser-
vices, the vendor was dependent on the quality and timeli-
ness of the inputs provided by customer managers and
employees (C1). In contrast to the KPN and port authority
cases, however, the outsourced service only indirectly
affected performance toward the customer's customer. Only
when problems with these HR services led to staff shortages
would the service ultimately affect external customers, but
there were no structural indications of this.
With some 700 managers who had to update information
regarding their staff and themselves, the service network was
certainly complex. To complicate matters, the supplier had
moved its helpdesk from the Netherlands to Southern Spain
and the customer had ‘thrown over the fence’ a nonoptimized
IT landscape toward the outsourcing partner (C2). The outsour-
cing contract had been focused on cost reduction, and the call
center had been moved abroad for labor cost reasons. Call cen-
ter agent incentives were also mostly aimed at productivity, not
at quality (C3). Many outages and mistakes led to extremely
low employee satisfaction, extensive rework, and exploding
costs (C4). As a result, there was low relationship quality, with
mistrust on both sides, amplified by the drastic reduction in in-
house HR staff who accompanied the introduction of the DIY
service (C5). The central workers council, an important internal
body in Dutch corporate law especially regarding labor condi-
tions, demanded that something should be done.
Fortunately, the mistrust on both sides did not prevent the
parties from sitting down together. There was a willingness to
discuss openly how to improve performance; there was much
to be gained (M1). In the problem diagnosis phase, a collabora-
tive diagnostics workshop was held with representatives from
both the customer and the IT vendor. A causal loop diagram
was developed with all the stakeholders involved, and a sys-
temic end-to-end model of the workflow interactions related to
HR IT systems was developed (M2). This identified the root
causes of nonperformance. It became clear that the outsourced,
nonoptimized IT landscape was creating havoc in the HR pro-
cesses. The process interactions between customer staff and
supplier staff contained many flaws. Customer staff that suf-
fered from high workloads had to find time to submit sick-
leave details in complicated IT tools, with unhelpful support
from the supplier's call center in Spain, staffed with cheap
labor. This led to irritation, time lost in rework, and even higher
workloads on both sides. The irritations then led to higher
churn at the call center, which further reduced their expertise
level. This led to even more mistakes, overtime, corner cutting,
FIGURE 4 Major IT incidents per month at port authority,
2012–2013 (indexed; number of incidents in January 2012 = 100)
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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irritation etcetera, while quality was eroding further (Oliva &
Sterman, 2001).
At the outset there were many technical KPIs, not related
to end-of-process outcomes, and there was a strong focus on
cost reduction. A team consisting of a manager from both
parties and support staff (M3) decided to reduce the extant
25 KPIs to just three, with a focus on quality rather than
costs: (a) lead time in dealing with customer query tickets;
(b) FTR percentage in dealing with service requests; and
(c) employee satisfaction. This set-up in turn led to coherent
and aligned incentives (M4).
The analysis of the work processes and the definition of
fewer KPIs led to transparency of process performance on both
sides. Both parties indicated that they highly appreciated the
opportunity to have a detailed look into each other's operations
(O1). In a subsequent collaborative service design process, two
months after the workshop, remedies were detailed out, includ-
ing investments in optimization of systems, interfaces, and pro-
cesses (O2). In a number of areas, operational performance
improved (O3). The HR operations manager reported a reduc-
tion in the number of open tickets and a resolution of the lead
time problem. The relationship quality between the utility com-
pany and its HR/payroll outsourcing partner improved substan-
tially as a result of the intervention (O4). Directly after at the
initial root cause modeling workshop, participants indicated
“more understanding for [Supplier],” “more understanding of
interrelations of processes,” and “everyone has the intention to
collaborate and improve.” In the month afterwards, employee
satisfaction increased, and rework and related costs decreased.
However, the overall improvements in outcomes were less sub-
stantial than for the other two interventions.
As identified earlier, collaborative KPIs share three com-
mon elements: they align goals because they are focusing on
end-of-process indicators; they are two-way; and they are
defined in a collaborative process. In this case, only two of
these conditions were met. In the end, no specific KPIs were
implemented to measure the activities and performance of
the customer, although the root cause analysis workshop had
identified several possible indicators, such as available docu-
mentation of processes, training of customer staff in the rele-
vant workflows, and completeness of queries submitted to
the supplier. Ultimately, however, the intervention did not
include buyer-facing KPIs due to changes in the external
business conditions in early 2016. Based on new govern-
ment regulations with regard to the split of energy produc-
tion and distribution, it became clear that the company
would have to be split. This challenge started to dominate
the agenda of senior management. The split of HR systems
was one of the major projects that had to be taken on, and
management decided to fully focus on this before dedicating
serious efforts to redesigning existing work processes.
Table 3 summarizes the similarities and differences
across the original design case and the two evaluation cases,
for the various elements of the CIMO framework.
9 | PROPOSITIONS AND
TRANSFERABILITY OF THE DESIGN
Based on the original design case and the two evaluation
cases, we now put forward five actionable propositions
(Kaipia et al., 2017) or technological rules (Van Aken,
2004) relating to the application of the collaborative KPI
contracting approach. In these cases, we have designed and
evaluated the collaborative KPI contracting approach,
defined as a process for developing buyer–supplier relation-
ship performance indicators that (a) promote collaboration
by focusing on end-of-process indicators; (b) are ‘two-way’
by measuring both supplier performance and also customer
(buying firm) performance; and (c) are defined in a collabo-
rative process, together by the supplier and the customer.
Two of the three cases (KPN-Atos and the port authority
case) have demonstrated that (and how) using a combination
of supplier-facing and buyer-facing KPIs leads to substantial
improvements in performance outcomes. Across the three
cases, the specific KPIs used were substantively different to
reflect the specific service processes and the business priori-
ties of each case. In all the three cases, albeit to a varying
degree, the approach led to higher process transparency (out-
come O1), better decision-making (O2), better operational
performance (O3), and higher relationship quality (O4).
Because our intervention in the energy company was cut
short because of the company split, KPIs measuring the cus-
tomer's performance toward the buyer were identified but
not implemented. Still, the new KPIs were collaborative in
the sense that they measured end-of-process performance
and were developed collaboratively. The operational perfor-
mance improvements in the energy company case, however,
appear more limited than in the other two cases, and this
may be partly explained by this lack of buyer-facing KPIs.
This leads to our first proposition:
P1: Performance of an outsourced, co-produced
service will be enhanced by the use of KPIs that
measure and reward both supplier and customer
(buying firm) performance.
In all the three cases, collaborative processes were used to
effectively develop and implement the collaborative KPI
contracting approach; the change management approach was
quite similar in all the three cases. More specifically, the
mechanisms triggered by the change approach are similar.
There was a willingness to engage in open dialogue (M1),
systemic thinking and modeling was used to facilitate an
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integral understanding of the process (M2), consensus and
commitment were fostered (M3), which led to alignment of
incentives through collaborative KPIs (M4). Teams were
formed with representatives from both organizations, and
these teams played a central role in analyzing the problems
and developing the possible solutions. These teams always
included the representatives that were intimately familiar
with the actual service operations. We therefore put forward:
P2: The development of a collaborative KPI
contracting approach, and thereby the perfor-
mance of an outsourced, co-produced service,
will be enhanced by the use of collaborative
development and change management pro-
cesses, involving representatives deeply famil-
iar with the actual service operations and the
interdependencies between the service pro-
cesses at the supplier and the buyer.
For more specific propositions regarding the conditions
under which the collaborative KPI contracting approach may
be transferrable or the most effective, we turn to the contex-
tual factors. Coproduction of the outsourced service (C1) is
an essential requirement for the implementation of the collab-
orative contracting approach, as buyer-facing KPIs would not
be necessary otherwise. The evaluation cases have provided
more specific insights regarding the sub-requirement of C1
that the co-produced service should ‘affect the customer's
business’. It has become clear that this effect may occur in
two different ways; as an impact on external customers or as
an impact on internal operations and employees. In the KPN
and port authority cases, the operational performance of the
customer toward its own customers is directly affected by the
performance of the service suppliers. Nowadays, such settings
are quite common as a substantial share of outsourced ser-
vices is directly part of the buying organization's value propo-
sition to its customers (Wynstra, Spring, & Schoenherr,
2015). In those situations, the supplier and the buying organi-
zation typically coproduce a service for the benefit of external
customers. In contrast, the energy company case demonstrates
that impact on the customer's business does not have to imply
that the customer's customers are directly affected. The busi-
ness of the customer (buying organization) may also be
affected by outsourced ‘back office’ services (Chase & Apte,
2007) that ‘only’ have a direct and substantial impact on its
internal operations processes and its employees, as in the case
of outsourced HR services and salary administration. Only in
exceptional cases—such as when personnel is not hired on
time—will lack of adequate performance affect external cus-
tomers, and then only indirectly. As we have demonstrated,
coproduction of services can also apply to such outsourced
‘back-office’ services, and collaborative KPI contracting can
thus be effective. This also means that the collaborative KPI
contracting approach does not by definition have to include
(among others) end-of-process indicators that assess perfor-
mance toward or satisfaction of external customers. These
KPIs can also be related to outputs or outcomes related to
internal customers. Thus, we propose:
P3: The collaborative KPI contracting approach
will have a positive effect on the performance of
an outsourced, co-produced service, both when
these services directly affect external customers
of the buyer and when these services directly
affect the primary processes of the buyer.
Complexity of the service process network (C2) appears also a
required condition. The collaborative KPI contracting method
requires a substantial commitment from management and staff
from both buyer and supplier, and therefore the context must
justify such a joint commitment: else simpler alternatives will
be more efficient. The port authority case demonstrates that
the collaborative KPI contracting approach may not only work
in situations of a more or less continuous complex service
delivery network, but also in situations where the service
delivery is irregular or occasional. Thus, we put forward:
P4: The collaborative KPI contracting approach
will have a positive effect on the performance of
an outsourced, co-produced, and complex ser-
vice, both in the case of services with continuous
delivery and in the case of discontinuous
delivery.
Severe operational performance issues (C4) and relationship
problems (C5) are not inherently necessary conditions, but
both form an incentive to adopt this approach and increase
the potential impact from the development and use of collab-
orative KPIs. As mentioned, two of the authors have applied
the collaborative KPI contracting approach in a number of
other settings. We tried to apply the method, unsuccessfully,
to a case in the banking industry, where there was coproduc-
tion of services directly affecting the customer's business
(C1) in a complex operational service network (C2). How-
ever, there was no burning platform in terms of operational
performance (C4) and mistrust on both sides (C5). We soon
found management unwilling to commit the required
resources to what to them still seemed a fairly straightfor-
ward design issue; there was not yet a burning platform. This
supports (but does not replicate, as the intervention ulti-
mately did not take place) the findings from our three cases,
suggesting that the efficacy of the collaborative KPI con-
tracting approach and its transferability are limited if there
are no substantial performance or relationship problems.
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TABLE 3 Case comparison
KPN Port authority Energy company
Outsourced IT services Yes; data centers, end-user
services, and software
house activities
Yes; ship traffic regulation Yes; HRM
Industry Telecom Transport infrastructure Energy
Size of annual contract N* 100 €M N* 10 €M N* €M
Duration of intervention 3 years 1 year 1 quarter
C1—Coproduction of services directly
affecting customer's business
Yes, directly affecting
customer's customer
Yes, directly affecting
customer's customer
Yes, but not directly
affecting customer's
customer
C2—Complex operational service
process network
Yes, continuous service Yes; discontinuous service Yes, continuous service
C3—Financially driven contract leading
to misaligned incentives
Yes Yes Yes
C4—Burning platform of low
operational performance and financial
losses
Yes Yes Yes
C5—Low relationship quality; mistrust
on both sides
Yes Yes Yes
I1—Process interventions to develop collaborative KPIs
Reframing the relationship from
adversarial to partnership
Yes Yes Yes
Magnitude of financial incentives; the
‘pot of gold’
1–2% of annual contract
value; predetermined amount
1–2% of annual contract
value; predetermined amount
Financial incentives in place;
no predetermined amount
Interviews and group meetings on
both sides
Yes Yes Some
Root cause analysis workshop Yes Yes Yes
I2—The collaborative KPI contracting method
Developing end-of-process KPIs Yes Yes Yes
‘Two-way’ supplier facing, and
customer facing
Yes Yes No
Developed in collaborative process,
together by supplier and customer
Yes Yes Yes
M1—Willingness to engage in open
dialogue (‘unfreeze’)
Yes Yes Yes
M2—Systemic end-to-end modeling
leading to integral understanding
Yes Yes Yes
M3—Collaborative design process
fostering consensus and commitment
Yes Yes Yes
M4—Alignment of incentives through
well-chosen collaborative KPIs
KPIs and incentives
for both supplier and
buyer; all business areas
KPIs and incentives
for both supplier and
buyer; focus on specific
problem areas
KPIs and incentives
for the supplier only
O1—Transparency of process
performance and its drivers
Full For key problem areas For supplier–buyer interface
O2—Performance transparency
improving decision-making
Comprehensive For key problem areas Some
O3—Improved operational performance Substantial improvement
in all aspects
In key problem
area yes, in others not
Some improvement
but issues remain
O4—Higher relationship quality High improvement Significant improvement Some improvement
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In the KPN-Atos and the two evaluation cases, there were
financially driven contracts (C3). Also this factor does not
form a necessary condition for the applicability of the col-
laborative KPI contracting approach. Still, financially-driven
contracts, with little to no attention to operational perfor-
mance, are often leading to mistrust and inadequate perfor-
mance, and in that way contribute to a ‘burning platform.’
In conclusion, we put forward:
P5: The collaborative KPI contracting approach
will have the biggest impact on performance
when there is a financially driven contract, very
low operational performance, and extensive mis-
trust on both sides.
In terms of the application domain, the original design
case and the two evaluations cases demonstrate that we can
have a certain degree of confidence in the efficacy of the col-
laborative KPI contracting approach for different forms of
IT-related services and that IT-intensive service sectors such
as telecom, infrastructure, and energy distribution are suit-
able industries (see Table 3). This does of course not mean
than the application domain is limited to these industries and
to outsourced IT services. Identifying the complete domain
of contexts to which the method can be transferred will
require further field testing. Currently, however, we see no
inherent characteristic of the collaborative KPI contracting
approach that limits its application to only IT services.
Therefore, we are not including an application field restric-
tion in our propositions.
10 | CONCLUSION
10.1 | Theoretical contributions
We posit that the collaborative KPI contracting artefact and
its demonstrated effects represent a novel contribution to theo-
ries on output controls and performance-based contracting.
The concept of collaborative KPI contracting complements
other recent research on performance-based contracting, such
as studies into the interaction of output and process controls
(Cardinal et al., 2017; Handley & Gray, 2013) or the interplay
between output controls and relational governance (Nullmeier
et al., 2016; Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014; Stouthuysen et al.,
2012). Our study demonstrates how relational governance,
especially the development of transparency and commitment,
is instrumental in developing and gathering support for a col-
laborative KPI contracting approach. This explanation reso-
nates with the argument that whenever a party is monitored, it
will perceive such governance as less intrusive when it is
embedded in relational norms (Heide et al., 2007; Ouchi,
1979). In contrast to prior research, our study addresses how
defining, verifying, and incentivizing the performance of spe-
cific processes at the buying firm can help alleviate the limita-
tions of traditional performance-based contracting (output
controls) when the supplier's liability for service delivery per-
formance is difficult to verify.
While we have limited the (managerial) application
domain of the collaborative KPI contracting approach to out-
sourced services characterized by extensive buyer–supplier
coproduction and complexity, future research can go beyond
that in formal theory building and testing (Phase 4 in DSR,
according to Holmström et al. (2009)). Buyer–supplier rela-
tions where physical products are being exchanged may also
be characterized by joint production, behavioral uncertainty
introduced by the buying firm and, consequently limited lia-
bility of the supplier (Handley & Gray, 2013; Mayer et al.,
2004). In particular, we submit that collaborative KPI con-
tracting could be managerially and theoretically relevant in
buyer–supplier exchanges that require intensive information
exchange and coordination of operations, such as in build-
to-order and engineer-to-order settings.
As indicated earlier, collaborative KPI contracting is similar
to yet different from some other supplier relationship manage-
ment tools that have recently been implemented. Supplier satis-
faction surveys are similar to collaborative KPI contracts in that
they typically refer to the quality of operational interactions
between the buyer and supplier, such as, ordering and delivery
processes (Essig & Amann, 2009; Vos, Schiele, & Hüttinger,
2016). Supplier satisfaction, defined as the supplier's “[…] feel-
ing of equity with the supply chain relationship […]”
(Benton & Maloni, 2005: p. 2), has been argued to have an
impact on, for instance, the stability of buyer–supplier relation-
ships (Essig & Amann, 2009). Supplier satisfaction surveys
are, however, different from collaborative KPI contracts in
three main aspects. First, supplier satisfaction survey scores do
not affect the financial rewards of the supplier. Second, supplier
satisfaction surveys, by definition, only measure perceptions of
just one actor in the relationship, whereas collaborative KPIs
measure quality and reliability of processes at both the cus-
tomer and the supplier (in addition to, possibly, satisfaction of
one or several actors). Finally, supplier satisfaction surveys are
largely standardized and aggregated, referring to general
buyer–supplier interactions (e.g., payment behavior), regardless
of the specific service or product being exchanged. Inciden-
tally, recommendations have been provided to extend supplier
satisfaction surveys into ‘dual accountability’ tools, such as a
two-way scorecard focusing on the operational and tactical
sub-processes at both the supplier and the buying firm
(Slobodow et al., 2008). In contrast to our collaborative KPI
contracting approach, however, these dual accountability tools
are not related to incentive schemes and thereby not specifically
designed to address the deficits of PBCs in the context of
buyer–supplier interdependencies in service outsourcing.
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Collaborative KPI contracting is, in spirit, similar to the
‘Vested’ approach advocated by Vitasek and colleagues, which
is recently gaining traction in practice (Vitasek et al., 2013).
Vested outsourcing emphasizes the importance of defining
high-level, strategic ‘desired outcomes’ (e.g., final customer
satisfaction) and the use of incentives rather than detailed pro-
cess specifications to encourage desired supplier behavior
(Vitasek et al., 2013). The important difference, however,
between collaborative KPI contracting and the ‘Vested’
approach is that the latter emphasizes the unilateral nature of
traditional, supplier-facing performance indicators: “The chal-
lenge in a Vested contract is to find the right incentive to moti-
vate service providers that ultimately will meet the company's
desired outcomes.” (Vitasek et al., 2013: p. 153–154).
Collaborative KPI contracting is different to all these
before-mentioned approaches, also because of its emphasis
on the interrelations between process and outcome. All four
outcomes of the approach we distinguished do not come
about only after the intervention has ended, but they grow
from the moment that the intervention starts. Transparency
of the process (O1) begins with the causal diagramming
workshop with all stakeholders. However, long after the ini-
tial intervention, the KPIs still provide transparency of per-
formance on both sides. Choosing suitable collaborative
KPIs and designing the process to define and measure them
are just the first instance of improved decision-making
(O2) that this higher transparency achieves. It may also
enable further service delivery redesign. As is evident from
the original design case (Figure 2) as well as from the port
authority evaluation case (Figure 4), operational perfor-
mance (O3) started to improve during the intervention, not
just afterwards. And, last but not least, from the first day of
the intervention, relationship quality starts improving (O4).
10.2 | Managerial implications
By defining, measuring, and incentivizing the quality of pro-
cesses at both the supplier and the buying firm, collaborative
KPIs can resolve the problems of implementing PBCs in situa-
tions of buyer–supplier interdependence. Collaborative KPI
contracting thus offers a potential remedy in situations of lim-
ited performance attributability, where traditional agency the-
ory suggests that PBCs cannot be effective (Eisenhardt, 1989).
In the original KPN-Atos case, but also in the port author-
ity and energy company evaluation cases, it became clear to
both parties that the buying firm had an important role in sup-
porting supplier performance in two areas. First, the customer
was important in supporting the successful operational deliv-
ery of the service by the supplier. This was reflected in the
development of buying-firm facing operational and enabling
KPIs. While the actual KPIs will differ depending on the type
of service, we postulate that because of the coproductive
nature of business-to-business services, this supporting role is
found in many services (Nullmeier et al., 2016; Selviaridis &
Norrman, 2014; Tanskanen, Holmström, & Öhman, 2015;
Vitasek et al., 2013). The second role of the customer was in
commercially supporting the business of the supplier particu-
larly regarding the efficiencies of serving this customer, in the
KPN-Atos case reflected in the share-of-wallet KPI. This is a
typical feature in many outsourcing relations, although rarely
made explicit. Applying collaborative KPIs here as well will
make this role more tangible.
The managerial relevance of the collaborative KPI contract-
ing approach was validated soon after the initial case. In the
Netherlands, the turnaround helped the KPN CPO win the Pro-
curement Manager of the Year Award in 2006 and soon after,
the innovation won the 2008 Institute of Supply Management
R. Gene Richter Award for Innovation and Leadership in Sup-
ply Management, in the USA. These acknowledgements are
also a reflection that many organizations find themselves in
similar situations.
The collaborative KPI contracting approach is the core
design artefact in our study, but we have also described, in
detail, the analysis, development, and implementation process
that was adopted; both for the initial design case and the two
subsequent evaluation cases. The novelty of this collaborative
service design process in itself is limited; it largely relies on
existing tools and methods, such as systemic modeling inter-
ventions. Still, both the original design study and the evalua-
tion cases suggest that the collaborative service design
process is crucial in successfully developing and implement-
ing the collaborative KPI contracting approach. To be effec-
tive, the collaborative KPI contracting approach should be
adapted to the specific context; indeed, effective designs in
(service) operations management are typically highly context
dependent (Groop et al., 2017). Most tangibly, this contextu-
alization takes place in identifying and selecting which buyer-
facing and supplier-facing KPIs to apply. The collaborative
service design process provides a structured approach for
achieving this required contextualization. In sum, the inte-
grated combination of the collaborative KPI contracting
approach itself and the collaborative service design to develop
and implement the approach in a specific case makes this
overall design artefact inherently transferable. The generic
model can in this way be used as a design model for making
context-specific designs (Van Aken et al., 2016).
In addition, we reviewed the general empirical boundary
conditions that may affect the applicability and efficacy of
our design (Groop et al., 2017), as elaborated in the action-
able propositions presented earlier. Based on our current
design knowledge, we see the collaborative contracting
approach being applicable to various types of outsourced
services characterized by extensive buyer–supplier copro-
duction and complexity. These services may be affecting
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external customers or ‘only’ the primary processes of the
buyer (P3), may follow a continuous or discontinuous deliv-
ery process (P4) and do not necessarily have to be IT-related
services. The efficacy of the collaborative KPI contracting
approach is positively affected by the presence of financially
driven contracts, low operational performance, and buyer–
supplier mistrust (P5).
Effectively implementing the collaborative KPI contract-
ing approach relies on two key notions. Firstly, that services
indeed co-produced by buyer and supplier, and that this
means that good performance can only be achieved through
close collaboration between both sides. Secondly, that the
main focus for senior management should not be in taking a
close and genuine interest in detailed interactions at the
operational level. This is the level at which stakeholders
interact most closely and at which collaboration needs to be
seamless. This once again illustrates the truth observed by
Skinner (1969) half a century ago: effective operations man-
agement is essential for a successful business strategy.
10.3 | Methodological considerations and
further research
Our study has applied a design science approach. In doing
so, we follow Van de Ven's approach of engaged scholar-
ship, in which organizations are seen not as “data collection
sites and funding sources”, but as a “learning workplace
(idea factory)” where practitioners and scholars coproduce
knowledge on important issues by testing alternative ideas
and different views of a common problem (Van de Ven &
Johnson, 2006: p. 809). The concept of collaborative KPIs
did not exist in management practice or in academic litera-
ture. Academic literature only recently has started to investi-
gate the challenge of outcome attributability in the context
of performance-based contracting and possible remedies.
Therefore, neither an inductive case study, nor a deductive
survey study would have been able to identify this new
design artefact or solution (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Only
by intensively engaging in problem-solving in the initial
KPN-Atos case were we able to derive the detailed insights
required to develop the concept of collaborative KPIs. Only
by going into the field, during the initial case and the subse-
quent evaluation cases, were we able to develop the context-
specific insights both into the appropriate collaborative KPIs
and into the change processes required, and the tight interde-
pendencies between the two. Our research illustrates that
research in operations management needs DSR, not as sub-
stitute but as a complement to traditional research strategies.
Still, as any other study, our research has some limita-
tions. First, each of the cases has involved the active role of
two of the authors. While we therefore have specifically
sought the collaboration with two authors that have not been
involved in the actual intervention activities, this still leaves
room for some possible bias in reporting. Hence, it is impor-
tant that other researchers can use our artefact and proposi-
tions in other (DSR) studies. A second limitation pertains to
the fact that our cases come from a limited range of countries
and one type of services (IT). Further work thus remains to
be done regarding the empirical boundary conditions regard-
ing the applicability and efficacy of the collaborative KPI
contracting approach.
Specifically, further research on collaborative KPI contract-
ing could be developed in at least two directions. Firstly, our
case studies involved IT services or services with a substantial
IT component. While there are a priori no counter-indications
that collaborative KPI contracting is not suitable for other types
of services, it may be useful to explicitly investigate its imple-
mentation and effectiveness for other services that rely on sub-
stantial efforts and resources from both the buyer/customer and
the supplier, such as specific types of cleaning services
(Nullmeier et al., 2016). A specific consideration in such stud-
ies should relate to the process of defining and monitoring
KPIs, which may be more challenging for a service process
that does not generate as much measurement information, and
as efficiently, as IT processes tend to do. A second direction
for subsequent research could be to investigate whether collab-
orative KPI contracting can be effectively applied in situations
where the outsourced service does not affect the end customers
of the buying firm. Our third proposition suggests that the col-
laborative KPI contracting approach is not just suitable for situ-
ations where (the quality of) particular processes at the buying
firm have a direct impact on the supplier's ability to achieve a
certain performance vis-á-vis final customers. However, as the
KPI contracting approach implemented in the energy company
case was, due to external conditions, not fully collaborative,
further (design science) research should investigate the effec-
tiveness of the full approach in those situations where the final
customer is not (directly) affected by the outsourced service.
The development and measurement process of the collabora-
tive KPIs in such situations may be somewhat less compli-
cated, but any operational and cost problems are presumably
less likely to create the required burning platform.
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APPENDIX A: CAUSAL-LOOP DIAGRAMMING
FROM COLLABORATIVE SERVICE DESIGN
WORKSHOP
A causal-loop diagram was developed with the group of some
20 executives from both KPN and Atos, to get to the root of
the question: “What happens when things go wrong?”.
Figure A1 shows part of the causal-loop diagram generated by
the group when examining causes of problems in the network.
The causal-loop diagram provided detailed insights into the
propagation of errors. At the top-left is a central element: some
interface between IT systems during the day breaks down. Con-
sequently, the order entry systems are not or are only partially
available. This means that new customer orders cannot be
(fully) entered, that systems cannot be updated, and that pend-
ing queries cannot be resolved. There are many potential rea-
sons for such an interface breakdown. Some of them are
technical, others are human. The top-right part of the diagram
explains why this happens so often. Most importantly, when a
change is made to one of the 40 or so critical systems in the
delivery process, the effect on any of the other systems is
unclear, because of the large number of systems involved, com-
plex interdependencies, and lack of control over their interfaces.
Mostly, these are the responsibility of the IT vendor but there
remain many interfaces with KPN.
When errors are made in the customer-facing processes,
staff will try to correct them. This is described in the lower-
middle part of the diagram. Doing so is a complex undertaking,
requiring considerable skill. Most of that skill had either left
the companies or was becoming obsolete as a result of the
ongoing changes in all these systems. Budgets were too low to
keep technical expertise up to standard. As a result, actual ser-
vice deliveries were not ‘FTR’ far too often. The bottom-left of
the diagram illustrates the vicious cycle of the service delivery
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FIGURE A1 A causal-loop diagram of propagation of errors in the network [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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process when such errors occurred. Mistakes in service deliver-
ies could be caused by the wrong kind of confirmation letter to
the customer because of system errors or because of data pollu-
tion in the systems as a result of inadequate error corrections.
In all cases, mistakes lead to customer confusion, customer
queries and, therefore, greater time pressure for the agents to
sort out these queries, leaving even less time to deal with the
list of known errors to be resolved. Obviously, these agents
were mostly KPN agents. Such a delivery process evidently
leads to low customer satisfaction, lower future revenues, and
further pressure on budgets both for KPN and Atos, thus creat-
ing yet another vicious cycle of low performance, leading to
low revenues, low investments, and even lower performance.
This is shown in the bottom of the diagram. These are precisely
the kinds of vicious cycles that keep service quality lower than
it needs to be (Oliva & Sterman, 2001).
APPENDIX B: TOP-LEVEL
COLLABORATIVE KPIS
ATOS KPIS
Innovation and redesign
The objective was to incentivize Atos to introduce innova-
tive ideas and concepts that could be used to improve KPN's
IT and help redesign KPI's IT infrastructure and customer-
facing processes to cope with new business areas, such as
Voice over Internet Protocol.
Operational and enabling KPIs
The objective was to measure the performance of critical
processes, both at the operational level and the more tactical
(enabling) level. These KPIs were divided into three groups:
Service Process (five KPIs weighing together for 30%;
e.g., measurement of end user satisfaction with the IT-chain
of the service process PSTN/ISDN (based on data from an
external market research agency); Delivery Process (seven
KPIs weighing together for 30%, e.g., uptime of applications
that support the day-process of delivery PSTN/ISDN) and
Service and Delivery Chain Management (these included the
enabling processes, five KPIs weighing together for 40%,
e.g., completeness of delivery protocols).
Total cost of ownership
The objective was to measure the total cost reduction. As
Atos was managing the IT systems, it was a logical KPI for
Atos. This KPI was linked to performance in some of the
operational and enabling sub-KPIs.
Business unit (BU) client satisfaction
The objective was to improve client satisfaction at the BU
level at KPN. To improve cooperation, it was essential to
reduce animosity between the two parties.
Sell to, with, and through
The objective was to encourage commercial collaboration. Three
sales-oriented objectives that were important to KPN: selling
telephone and communication services to Atos (‘sell to’); Atos
selling ICT solutions in the market, whereby KPN would take
care of the ‘C’ of the ICT element and Atos of the ‘IT’ element
(‘with’); and using Atos market channels to expand KPN's
telephone and communication business (‘through’).
KPN KPIS
Wallet share
The objective was to measure Atos's opportunities to achieve
economies of scale. Although KPN's objective was to reduce
its IT spending, it was strongly felt that this should not be to
detrimental for Atos. In reducing KPN's IT spend, Atos's
share should not be reduced in favor of other IT vendors. If
so, then Atos would be compensated.
IT governance
The objective was to measure KPN's customer demand disci-
pline. As the outsourcing had taken place in great haste,
demand management, IT procurement, and IT governance were
not very well developed. The components of IT governance
were awareness and use of the IT management manual, quality
level and use of the contract-management structure, IT demand
professionalism as reflected in a capability maturity model, IT
overhead levels, and issue prevention.
Operational and enabling KPIs
The objective was to measure the performance of critical
processes, both at the operational level and the more tactical
(‘enabling’) level. KPIs were divided into two groups: deliv-
ery process (two KPIs weighing together for 40%, e.g., “KPN
reacts to the notification of the service disruption and supplies
the required instructions”) and service and delivery chain
management (these included the enabling processes, five KPIs
weighing 60%, e.g., timely availability of service protocols).
There were no service process KPIs (as in the case of Atos),
as KPN was not responsible for executing the operational
delivery process.
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